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Micro AGI

Build a self-modifying agent that creates its own tools at runtime — reading docs, writing Lua, registering entries in the registry, and loading them into the active session.

A terminal agent that:

  • Answers questions using an LLM with streaming
  • Searches Wippy documentation to learn APIs
  • Inspects the registry to discover existing capabilities
  • Builds new tools on the fly when it lacks a capability
  • Manages its own context window via compression
flowchart LR
User -->|prompt| Agent
Agent -->|step| LLM[GPT-5.1]
LLM -->|tool_calls| Agent
Agent -->|funcs.call| Tools
Tools -->|result| Agent
Agent -->|text| User
subgraph Tools
doc_search
registry_list
registry_read
create_tool
load_tool
end

The agent runs as a Wippy process with access to the registry. When the LLM decides it needs a capability it doesn’t have, it uses the self-modification loop:

sequenceDiagram
participant U as User
participant A as Agent
participant L as LLM
participant R as Registry
U->>A: "what time is it?"
A->>L: step(conversation)
L->>A: tool_call: doc_search("lua/core/time")
A->>A: execute doc_search
A->>L: step(conversation + tool result)
L->>A: tool_call: create_tool(name, source, schema)
A->>R: evaluate deny policies + changeset create
R->>A: ok
A->>L: step(conversation + tool result)
L->>A: tool_call: load_tool("app.generated:current_time")
A->>A: ctx:add_tools() + reload agent
A->>L: step(conversation + tool result)
L->>A: tool_call: current_time()
A->>A: execute new tool
A->>L: step(conversation + tool result)
L->>A: text: "The current time is..."
A->>U: stream response

The key insight: tools are registry entries. Creating a tool is just writing a function.lua entry with inline Lua source in data.source. The agent runtime compiles and loads it like any other entry.

micro-agi/
├── .wippy.yaml
├── wippy.yaml
└── src/
├── _index.yaml
├── README.md
├── agent.lua
└── tools/
├── _index.yaml
├── doc_search.lua
├── registry_list.lua
├── registry_read.lua
├── create_tool.lua
└── load_tool.lua

Create .wippy.yaml:

version: "1.0"
logger:
encoding: console

Create src/_index.yaml with infrastructure, security policies, models, agent, and process:

version: "1.0"
namespace: app
entries:
- name: definition
kind: ns.definition
readme: file://README.md
meta:
title: Micro AGI
description: Self-modifying development agent that builds its own tools at runtime
depends_on: [wippy/llm, wippy/agent]
- name: os_env
kind: env.storage.os
- name: processes
kind: process.host
lifecycle:
auto_start: true
- name: __dep.llm
kind: ns.dependency
component: wippy/llm
version: "*"
parameters:
- name: env_storage
value: app:os_env
- name: process_host
value: app:processes
- name: __dep.agent
kind: ns.dependency
component: wippy/agent
version: "*"
parameters:
- name: process_host
value: app:processes

Two security.policy entries restrict which namespaces the agent can write to:

- name: deny_core_ns
kind: security.policy
policy:
actions: "*"
resources: "app:*"
effect: deny
groups:
- agent_security
- name: deny_tools_ns
kind: security.policy
policy:
actions: "*"
resources: "app.tools:*"
effect: deny
groups:
- agent_security

These policies are loaded as a named scope (app:agent_security) by create_tool and evaluated before any registry write. The agent can write to app.generated:* (no deny policy matches), but cannot write to app:* (core entries, models, agent definition) or app.tools:* (built-in tools).

See Security Model for details on policy evaluation.

Two models serve different purposes:

- name: gpt-5.1
kind: registry.entry
meta:
name: gpt-5.1
type: llm.model
title: GPT-5.1
comment: Reasoning model
capabilities: [generate, tool_use, structured_output, vision, thinking]
class: [reasoning]
priority: 210
max_tokens: 128000
output_tokens: 32768
pricing:
input: 2.5
output: 10
providers:
- id: wippy.llm.openai:provider
options:
reasoning_model_request: true
provider_model: gpt-5.1
thinking_effort: 10
- name: gpt-4.1-nano
kind: registry.entry
meta:
name: gpt-4.1-nano
type: llm.model
title: GPT-4.1 Nano
comment: Compression model
capabilities: [generate, tool_use, structured_output]
class: [fast]
priority: 100
max_tokens: 1047576
output_tokens: 32768
pricing:
input: 0.1
output: 0.4
providers:
- id: wippy.llm.openai:provider
provider_model: gpt-4.1-nano

GPT-5.1 handles reasoning and tool use. GPT-4.1 Nano handles context compression at 25x lower cost.

- name: dev_assistant
kind: registry.entry
meta:
type: agent.gen1
name: dev_assistant
title: Dev Assistant
comment: Wippy development assistant
prompt: |
Self-modifying Wippy development agent. You run inside Wippy runtime
with access to docs, registry, and dynamic tool creation.
Rules:
- NEVER fabricate, guess, or hallucinate facts. If you need real data,
use or build a tool to get it. Only state what a tool actually returned.
- Maximum 2-3 sentences per response. No bullet lists. No disclaimers.
- Never say "I can't" or "I don't have". Build the tool and do it.
- Act first, explain only if asked.
To gain new capabilities: doc_search the API, create_tool with Lua source,
load_tool, call it. All in one turn.
model: gpt-5.1
max_tokens: 2048
tools:
- "app.tools:*"

The prompt is deliberately terse. Key rules:

  • No hallucination — the agent must use tools for real data
  • Self-modification — build tools instead of refusing
  • Action over explanation — do first, explain if asked
- name: agent
kind: process.lua
meta:
command:
name: agent
short: Start dev assistant
source: file://agent.lua
method: main
modules: [io, json, process, funcs, registry, time, security]
imports:
prompt: wippy.llm:prompt
agent_context: wippy.agent:context
compress: wippy.llm.util:compress

The process runs as a terminal command. Security enforcement happens inside create_tool which loads the agent_security policy group and evaluates it before writing.

Imports:

  • prompt — conversation builder
  • agent_context — agent loading and dynamic tool management
  • compress — LLM-based text compression for context management

Create src/tools/_index.yaml with five tools:

Fetches Wippy documentation via the wippy.ai/llm API. Supports two modes: fetch a page by path, or search by query.

local http_client = require("http_client")
local json = require("json")
local BASE_URL = "https://wippy.ai/llm"
local MAX_CHARS = 8000
local function fetch_page(path)
local url = BASE_URL .. "/path/en/" .. path
local resp, err = http_client.get(url, {
headers = { ["User-Agent"] = "wippy-agent/1.0" },
})
if err then
return nil, tostring(err)
end
if resp.status_code ~= 200 then
return nil, "HTTP " .. resp.status_code
end
local body = resp.body or ""
if #body > MAX_CHARS then
body = body:sub(1, MAX_CHARS) .. "\n... (truncated)"
end
return body, nil
end
local function search_docs(query)
local url = BASE_URL .. "/search?q=" .. query
local resp, err = http_client.get(url, {
headers = { ["User-Agent"] = "wippy-agent/1.0" },
})
if err then
return { error = tostring(err) }
end
if resp.status_code ~= 200 then
return { error = "HTTP " .. resp.status_code }
end
local body = resp.body or ""
if #body > MAX_CHARS then
body = body:sub(1, MAX_CHARS) .. "\n... (truncated)"
end
return { results = body }
end
local function handler(input)
if input.path then
local content, err = fetch_page(input.path)
if err then
return { error = err }
end
return { path = input.path, content = content }
end
if input.query then
return search_docs(input.query)
end
return { error = "provide either 'path' or 'query'" }
end
return { handler = handler }

The core of self-modification. Evaluates namespace deny policies and creates a function.lua entry in the registry with inline Lua source.

The modules field on the generated entry controls what the tool can access. Modules not listed simply do not exist for that entry — there is nothing to block or scan for.

local registry = require("registry")
local json = require("json")
local security = require("security")
local NAMESPACE = "app.generated"
local MAX_SOURCE_LEN = 16000
local MAX_NAME_LEN = 64
local ALLOWED_MODULES = {
time = true, json = true, http_client = true, expr = true,
text = true, base64 = true, yaml = true, crypto = true,
hash = true, uuid = true,
}

Policy evaluationcreate_tool loads the agent_security named scope and evaluates the deny policies against the target entry ID. Writes to app:* or app.tools:* are denied; writes to app.generated:* pass (no matching deny policy):

local actor = security.new_actor("service:agent", { role = "agent" })
local scope, scope_err = security.named_scope("app:agent_security")
if scope_err then
return { error = "failed to load security scope: " .. tostring(scope_err) }
end
local result = scope:evaluate(actor, action, id)
if result == "deny" then
return { error = "policy denied: " .. action .. " on " .. id }
end

Registry write — the entry is written with source in data.source and only the allowed modules:

local entry = {
id = id,
kind = "function.lua",
meta = {
type = "tool",
title = input.name,
comment = input.description,
input_schema = schema,
llm_alias = input.name,
llm_description = input.description,
},
data = {
source = input.source,
modules = modules,
method = "handler",
},
}
local snap = registry.snapshot()
local changes = snap:changes()
if existing then
changes:update(entry)
else
changes:create(entry)
end
changes:apply()

No files on disk. The tool lives entirely in the registry.

Validates the entry is a tool and signals the agent loop to reload:

local function handler(input)
local entry, err = registry.get(input.id)
if err then
return { error = tostring(err) }
end
if not entry then
return { error = "not found: " .. input.id }
end
if not entry.meta or entry.meta.type ~= "tool" then
return { error = "not a tool (meta.type != 'tool'): " .. input.id }
end
return {
loaded = true,
id = entry.id,
alias = entry.meta.llm_alias or input.id,
description = entry.meta.llm_description or "",
}
end

The agent loop detects loaded = true in the result and calls ctx:add_tools(id) followed by ctx:load_agent() to recompile the agent with the new tool.

The agent loop in src/agent.lua handles streaming, tool execution, dynamic loading, and context compression.

Uses the same coroutine + channel pattern from the LLM Agent tutorial:

coroutine.spawn(function()
local response, err = session.runner:step(session.conversation, {
stream_target = {
reply_to = process.pid(),
topic = STREAM_TOPIC,
},
})
done_ch:send({ response = response, err = err })
end)

Tools are called via funcs.call() with pcall for safety:

local ok, result = pcall(funcs.call, tc.registry_id, args)

When load_tool returns loaded = true, the agent reloads itself:

flowchart TD
A[load_tool returns loaded=true] --> B[ctx:add_tools id]
B --> C[ctx:load_agent]
C --> D[New runner with added tool]
D --> E[Conversation preserved]
E --> F[Next LLM step sees new tool]
local function handle_tool_loading(tool_calls, results)
local reload_needed = false
for _, tc in ipairs(tool_calls) do
if tc.name == "load_tool" then
local result = results[tc.id]
if result and result.loaded then
session.ctx:add_tools(result.id)
reload_needed = true
end
end
end
if reload_needed then
reload_agent()
end
end

The conversation is preserved across reloads because it lives in the prompt builder, not in the runner.

When prompt tokens exceed 96K (75% of the 128K context window), the conversation is compressed using GPT-4.1 Nano:

if response.tokens and response.tokens.prompt_tokens
and response.tokens.prompt_tokens > PROMPT_TOKEN_LIMIT then
try_compress()
end

Compression extracts message content, calls compress.to_size() targeting 4000 characters, and replaces the conversation with a summary:

local summary = compress.to_size(COMPRESS_MODEL, full_text, COMPRESS_TARGET)
session.conversation = prompt.new()
session.conversation:add_system("Conversation summary:\n\n" .. summary)

The agent is secured through namespace deny policies and module-level access control.

flowchart TD
LLM[LLM generates tool] --> P{Namespace Deny Policies}
P -->|scope:evaluate| Check{Target namespace?}
Check -->|app.generated:*| OK[No deny match]
Check -->|app:* or app.tools:*| Deny[Policy Denied]
OK --> M{Module Allowlist}
M -->|only granted modules| R[Registry write]
M -->|unknown module requested| Err[Rejected]
PolicyResourcesEffect
deny_core_nsapp:*deny
deny_tools_nsapp.tools:*deny

create_tool loads the agent_security policy group and evaluates against the target entry ID. Since deny policies only match app:* and app.tools:*, writes to app.generated:* pass through (result is undefined, meaning “not denied”).

This prevents the agent from:

  • Modifying its own prompt or agent definition (app:dev_assistant)
  • Overwriting its built-in tools (app.tools:*)
  • Changing infrastructure entries (app:processes, etc.)

Generated tools declare their modules in data.modules. Only modules from the ALLOWED_MODULES set are permitted. The Wippy runtime enforces this at the module level — if a module is not listed on the entry, require() returns an error. There is no source code scanning because there is nothing to scan for: modules that are not granted do not exist in the execution context.

Run directly from hub:

Terminal window
wippy run wippy/micro-agi agent

Or clone and run locally:

Terminal window
cd micro-agi
wippy init && wippy update
wippy run agent
dev assistant (quit to exit)
> what time is it?
[doc_search] ok
[create_tool] ok
[load_tool] ok
[+] app.generated:current_time_utc
[current_time_utc] ok
The current UTC time is 2026-02-13T03:13:41Z.
> fetch https://httpbin.org/get and show my ip
[create_tool] ok
[load_tool] ok
[+] app.generated:http_get
[http_get] ok
Your IP is 203.0.113.42.